JDK8/Java8源码在线阅读
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* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
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* under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 only, as
* published by the Free Software Foundation. Oracle designates this
* particular file as subject to the "Classpath" exception as provided
* by Oracle in the LICENSE file that accompanied this code.
*
* This code is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
* version 2 for more details (a copy is included in the LICENSE file that
* accompanied this code).
*
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* 2 along with this work; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
* Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
*
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package sun.security.ssl;
import java.io.*;
import java.math.BigInteger;
import java.security.*;
import java.util.*;
import java.security.interfaces.ECPublicKey;
import java.security.interfaces.RSAPublicKey;
import java.security.spec.ECParameterSpec;
import java.security.cert.X509Certificate;
import java.security.cert.CertificateException;
import java.security.cert.CertificateParsingException;
import javax.security.auth.x500.X500Principal;
import javax.crypto.SecretKey;
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;
import javax.net.ssl.*;
import javax.security.auth.Subject;
import sun.security.ssl.HandshakeMessage.*;
import static sun.security.ssl.CipherSuite.KeyExchange.*;
/**
* ClientHandshaker does the protocol handshaking from the point
* of view of a client. It is driven asychronously by handshake messages
* as delivered by the parent Handshaker class, and also uses
* common functionality (e.g. key generation) that is provided there.
*
* @author David Brownell
*/
final class ClientHandshaker extends Handshaker {
// the server's public key from its certificate.
private PublicKey serverKey;
// the server's ephemeral public key from the server key exchange message
// for ECDHE/ECDH_anon and RSA_EXPORT.
private PublicKey ephemeralServerKey;
// server's ephemeral public value for DHE/DH_anon key exchanges
private BigInteger serverDH;
private DHCrypt dh;
private ECDHCrypt ecdh;
private CertificateRequest certRequest;
private boolean serverKeyExchangeReceived;
/*
* The RSA PreMasterSecret needs to know the version of
* ClientHello that was used on this handshake. This represents
* the "max version" this client is supporting. In the
* case of an initial handshake, it's the max version enabled,
* but in the case of a resumption attempt, it's the version
* of the session we're trying to resume.
*/
private ProtocolVersion maxProtocolVersion;
// To switch off the SNI extension.
private final static boolean enableSNIExtension =
Debug.getBooleanProperty("jsse.enableSNIExtension", true);
/*
* Allow unsafe server certificate change?
*
* Server certificate change during SSL/TLS renegotiation may be considered
* unsafe, as described in the Triple Handshake attacks:
*
* https://secure-resumption.com/tlsauth.pdf
*
* Endpoint identification (See
* SSLParameters.getEndpointIdentificationAlgorithm()) is a pretty nice
* guarantee that the server certificate change in renegotiation is legal.
* However, endpoing identification is only enabled for HTTPS and LDAP
* over SSL/TLS by default. It is not enough to protect SSL/TLS
* connections other than HTTPS and LDAP.
*
* The renegotiation indication extension (See RFC 5764) is a pretty
* strong guarantee that the endpoints on both client and server sides
* are identical on the same connection. However, the Triple Handshake
* attacks can bypass this guarantee if there is a session-resumption
* handshake between the initial full handshake and the renegotiation
* full handshake.
*
* Server certificate change may be unsafe and should be restricted if
* endpoint identification is not enabled and the previous handshake is
* a session-resumption abbreviated initial handshake, unless the
* identities represented by both certificates can be regraded as the
* same (See isIdentityEquivalent()).
*
* Considering the compatibility impact and the actual requirements to
* support server certificate change in practice, the system property,
* jdk.tls.allowUnsafeServerCertChange, is used to define whether unsafe
* server certificate change in renegotiation is allowed or not. The
* default value of the system property is "false". To mitigate the
* compactibility impact, applications may want to set the system
* property to "true" at their own risk.
*
* If the value of the system property is "false", server certificate
* change in renegotiation after a session-resumption abbreviated initial
* handshake is restricted (See isIdentityEquivalent()).
*
* If the system property is set to "true" explicitly, the restriction on
* server certificate change in renegotiation is disabled.
*/
private final static boolean allowUnsafeServerCertChange =
Debug.getBooleanProperty("jdk.tls.allowUnsafeServerCertChange", false);
// Whether an ALPN extension was sent in the ClientHello
private boolean alpnActive = false;
private List<SNIServerName> requestedServerNames =
Collections.<SNIServerName>emptyList();
private boolean serverNamesAccepted = false;
/*
* the reserved server certificate chain in previous handshaking
*
* The server certificate chain is only reserved if the previous
* handshake is a session-resumption abbreviated initial handshake.
*/
private X509Certificate[] reservedServerCerts = null;
/*
* Constructors
*/
ClientHandshaker(SSLSocketImpl socket, SSLContextImpl context,
ProtocolList enabledProtocols,
ProtocolVersion activeProtocolVersion,
boolean isInitialHandshake, boolean secureRenegotiation,
byte[] clientVerifyData, byte[] serverVerifyData) {
super(socket, context, enabledProtocols, true, true,
activeProtocolVersion, isInitialHandshake, secureRenegotiation,
clientVerifyData, serverVerifyData);
}
ClientHandshaker(SSLEngineImpl engine, SSLContextImpl context,
ProtocolList enabledProtocols,
ProtocolVersion activeProtocolVersion,
boolean isInitialHandshake, boolean secureRenegotiation,
byte[] clientVerifyData, byte[] serverVerifyData) {
super(engine, context, enabledProtocols, true, true,
activeProtocolVersion, isInitialHandshake, secureRenegotiation,
clientVerifyData, serverVerifyData);
}
/*
* This routine handles all the client side handshake messages, one at
* a time. Given the message type (and in some cases the pending cipher
* spec) it parses the type-specific message. Then it calls a function
* that handles that specific message.
*
* It updates the state machine (need to verify it) as each message
* is processed, and writes responses as needed using the connection
* in the constructor.
*/
@Override
void processMessage(byte type, int messageLen) throws IOException {
if (state >= type
&& (type != HandshakeMessage.ht_hello_request)) {
throw new SSLProtocolException(
"Handshake message sequence violation, " + type);
}
switch (type) {
case HandshakeMessage.ht_hello_request:
this.serverHelloRequest(new HelloRequest(input));
break;
case HandshakeMessage.ht_server_hello:
this.serverHello(new ServerHello(input, messageLen));
break;
case HandshakeMessage.ht_certificate:
if (keyExchange == K_DH_ANON || keyExchange == K_ECDH_ANON
|| keyExchange == K_KRB5 || keyExchange == K_KRB5_EXPORT) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_unexpected_message,
"unexpected server cert chain");
// NOTREACHED
}
this.serverCertificate(new CertificateMsg(input));
serverKey =
session.getPeerCertificates()[0].getPublicKey();
break;
case HandshakeMessage.ht_server_key_exchange:
serverKeyExchangeReceived = true;
switch (keyExchange) {
case K_RSA_EXPORT:
/**
* The server key exchange message is sent by the server only
* when the server certificate message does not contain the
* proper amount of data to allow the client to exchange a
* premaster secret, such as when RSA_EXPORT is used and the
* public key in the server certificate is longer than 512 bits.
*/
if (serverKey == null) {
throw new SSLProtocolException
("Server did not send certificate message");
}
if (!(serverKey instanceof RSAPublicKey)) {
throw new SSLProtocolException("Protocol violation:" +
" the certificate type must be appropriate for the" +
" selected cipher suite's key exchange algorithm");
}
if (JsseJce.getRSAKeyLength(serverKey) <= 512) {
throw new SSLProtocolException("Protocol violation:" +
" server sent a server key exchange message for" +
" key exchange " + keyExchange +
" when the public key in the server certificate" +
" is less than or equal to 512 bits in length");
}
try {
this.serverKeyExchange(new RSA_ServerKeyExchange(input));
} catch (GeneralSecurityException e) {
throwSSLException("Server key", e);
}
break;
case K_DH_ANON:
try {
this.serverKeyExchange(new DH_ServerKeyExchange(
input, protocolVersion));
} catch (GeneralSecurityException e) {
throwSSLException("Server key", e);
}
break;
case K_DHE_DSS:
case K_DHE_RSA:
try {
this.serverKeyExchange(new DH_ServerKeyExchange(
input, serverKey,
clnt_random.random_bytes, svr_random.random_bytes,
messageLen,
localSupportedSignAlgs, protocolVersion));
} catch (GeneralSecurityException e) {
throwSSLException("Server key", e);
}
break;
case K_ECDHE_ECDSA:
case K_ECDHE_RSA:
case K_ECDH_ANON:
try {
this.serverKeyExchange(new ECDH_ServerKeyExchange
(input, serverKey, clnt_random.random_bytes,
svr_random.random_bytes,
localSupportedSignAlgs, protocolVersion));
} catch (GeneralSecurityException e) {
throwSSLException("Server key", e);
}
break;
case K_RSA:
case K_DH_RSA:
case K_DH_DSS:
case K_ECDH_ECDSA:
case K_ECDH_RSA:
throw new SSLProtocolException(
"Protocol violation: server sent a server key exchange"
+ "message for key exchange " + keyExchange);
case K_KRB5:
case K_KRB5_EXPORT:
throw new SSLProtocolException(
"unexpected receipt of server key exchange algorithm");
default:
throw new SSLProtocolException(
"unsupported key exchange algorithm = "
+ keyExchange);
}
break;
case HandshakeMessage.ht_certificate_request:
// save for later, it's handled by serverHelloDone
if ((keyExchange == K_DH_ANON) || (keyExchange == K_ECDH_ANON)) {
throw new SSLHandshakeException(
"Client authentication requested for "+
"anonymous cipher suite.");
} else if (keyExchange == K_KRB5 || keyExchange == K_KRB5_EXPORT) {
throw new SSLHandshakeException(
"Client certificate requested for "+
"kerberos cipher suite.");
}
certRequest = new CertificateRequest(input, protocolVersion);
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
certRequest.print(System.out);
}
if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) {
Collection<SignatureAndHashAlgorithm> peerSignAlgs =
certRequest.getSignAlgorithms();
if (peerSignAlgs == null || peerSignAlgs.isEmpty()) {
throw new SSLHandshakeException(
"No peer supported signature algorithms");
}
Collection<SignatureAndHashAlgorithm> supportedPeerSignAlgs =
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.getSupportedAlgorithms(
peerSignAlgs);
if (supportedPeerSignAlgs.isEmpty()) {
throw new SSLHandshakeException(
"No supported signature and hash algorithm in common");
}
setPeerSupportedSignAlgs(supportedPeerSignAlgs);
session.setPeerSupportedSignatureAlgorithms(
supportedPeerSignAlgs);
}
break;
case HandshakeMessage.ht_server_hello_done:
this.serverHelloDone(new ServerHelloDone(input));
break;
case HandshakeMessage.ht_finished:
// A ChangeCipherSpec record must have been received prior to
// reception of the Finished message (RFC 5246, 7.4.9).
if (!receivedChangeCipherSpec()) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"Received Finished message before ChangeCipherSpec");
}
this.serverFinished(
new Finished(protocolVersion, input, cipherSuite));
break;
default:
throw new SSLProtocolException(
"Illegal client handshake msg, " + type);
}
//
// Move state machine forward if the message handling
// code didn't already do so
//
if (state < type) {
state = type;
}
}
/*
* Used by the server to kickstart negotiations -- this requests a
* "client hello" to renegotiate current cipher specs (e.g. maybe lots
* of data has been encrypted with the same keys, or the server needs
* the client to present a certificate).
*/
private void serverHelloRequest(HelloRequest mesg) throws IOException {
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
mesg.print(System.out);
}
//
// Could be (e.g. at connection setup) that we already
// sent the "client hello" but the server's not seen it.
//
if (state < HandshakeMessage.ht_client_hello) {
if (!secureRenegotiation && !allowUnsafeRenegotiation) {
// renegotiation is not allowed.
if (activeProtocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS10.v) {
// response with a no_renegotiation warning,
warningSE(Alerts.alert_no_renegotiation);
// invalidate the handshake so that the caller can
// dispose this object.
invalidated = true;
// If there is still unread block in the handshake
// input stream, it would be truncated with the disposal
// and the next handshake message will become incomplete.
//
// However, according to SSL/TLS specifications, no more
// handshake message should immediately follow ClientHello
// or HelloRequest. So just let it be.
} else {
// For SSLv3, send the handshake_failure fatal error.
// Note that SSLv3 does not define a no_renegotiation
// alert like TLSv1. However we cannot ignore the message
// simply, otherwise the other side was waiting for a
// response that would never come.
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"Renegotiation is not allowed");
}
} else {
if (!secureRenegotiation) {
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
System.out.println(
"Warning: continue with insecure renegotiation");
}
}
kickstart();
}
}
}
/*
* Server chooses session parameters given options created by the
* client -- basically, cipher options, session id, and someday a
* set of compression options.
*
* There are two branches of the state machine, decided by the
* details of this message. One is the "fast" handshake, where we
* can resume the pre-existing session we asked resume. The other
* is a more expensive "full" handshake, with key exchange and
* probably authentication getting done.
*/
private void serverHello(ServerHello mesg) throws IOException {
serverKeyExchangeReceived = false;
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
mesg.print(System.out);
}
// check if the server selected protocol version is OK for us
ProtocolVersion mesgVersion = mesg.protocolVersion;
if (!isNegotiable(mesgVersion)) {
throw new SSLHandshakeException(
"Server chose " + mesgVersion +
", but that protocol version is not enabled or not supported " +
"by the client.");
}
handshakeHash.protocolDetermined(mesgVersion);
// Set protocolVersion and propagate to SSLSocket and the
// Handshake streams
setVersion(mesgVersion);
// check the "renegotiation_info" extension
RenegotiationInfoExtension serverHelloRI = (RenegotiationInfoExtension)
mesg.extensions.get(ExtensionType.EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO);
if (serverHelloRI != null) {
if (isInitialHandshake) {
// verify the length of the "renegotiated_connection" field
if (!serverHelloRI.isEmpty()) {
// abort the handshake with a fatal handshake_failure alert
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"The renegotiation_info field is not empty");
}
secureRenegotiation = true;
} else {
// For a legacy renegotiation, the client MUST verify that
// it does not contain the "renegotiation_info" extension.
if (!secureRenegotiation) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"Unexpected renegotiation indication extension");
}
// verify the client_verify_data and server_verify_data values
byte[] verifyData =
new byte[clientVerifyData.length + serverVerifyData.length];
System.arraycopy(clientVerifyData, 0, verifyData,
0, clientVerifyData.length);
System.arraycopy(serverVerifyData, 0, verifyData,
clientVerifyData.length, serverVerifyData.length);
if (!Arrays.equals(verifyData,
serverHelloRI.getRenegotiatedConnection())) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"Incorrect verify data in ServerHello " +
"renegotiation_info message");
}
}
} else {
// no renegotiation indication extension
if (isInitialHandshake) {
if (!allowLegacyHelloMessages) {
// abort the handshake with a fatal handshake_failure alert
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"Failed to negotiate the use of secure renegotiation");
}
secureRenegotiation = false;
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
System.out.println("Warning: No renegotiation " +
"indication extension in ServerHello");
}
} else {
// For a secure renegotiation, the client must abort the
// handshake if no "renegotiation_info" extension is present.
if (secureRenegotiation) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"No renegotiation indication extension");
}
// we have already allowed unsafe renegotation before request
// the renegotiation.
}
}
//
// Save server nonce, we always use it to compute connection
// keys and it's also used to create the master secret if we're
// creating a new session (i.e. in the full handshake).
//
svr_random = mesg.svr_random;
if (isNegotiable(mesg.cipherSuite) == false) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_illegal_parameter,
"Server selected improper ciphersuite " + mesg.cipherSuite);
}
setCipherSuite(mesg.cipherSuite);
if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) {
handshakeHash.setFinishedAlg(cipherSuite.prfAlg.getPRFHashAlg());
}
if (mesg.compression_method != 0) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_illegal_parameter,
"compression type not supported, "
+ mesg.compression_method);
// NOTREACHED
}
// so far so good, let's look at the session
if (session != null) {
// we tried to resume, let's see what the server decided
if (session.getSessionId().equals(mesg.sessionId)) {
// server resumed the session, let's make sure everything
// checks out
// Verify that the session ciphers are unchanged.
CipherSuite sessionSuite = session.getSuite();
if (cipherSuite != sessionSuite) {
throw new SSLProtocolException
("Server returned wrong cipher suite for session");
}
// verify protocol version match
ProtocolVersion sessionVersion = session.getProtocolVersion();
if (protocolVersion != sessionVersion) {
throw new SSLProtocolException
("Server resumed session with wrong protocol version");
}
// validate subject identity
if (sessionSuite.keyExchange == K_KRB5 ||
sessionSuite.keyExchange == K_KRB5_EXPORT) {
Principal localPrincipal = session.getLocalPrincipal();
Subject subject = null;
try {
subject = AccessController.doPrivileged(
new PrivilegedExceptionAction<Subject>() {
@Override
public Subject run() throws Exception {
return Krb5Helper.getClientSubject(getAccSE());
}});
} catch (PrivilegedActionException e) {
subject = null;
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) {
System.out.println("Attempt to obtain" +
" subject failed!");
}
}
if (subject != null) {
// Eliminate dependency on KerberosPrincipal
Set<Principal> principals =
subject.getPrincipals(Principal.class);
if (!principals.contains(localPrincipal)) {
throw new SSLProtocolException("Server resumed" +
" session with wrong subject identity");
} else {
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session"))
System.out.println("Subject identity is same");
}
} else {
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session"))
System.out.println("Kerberos credentials are not" +
" present in the current Subject; check if " +
" javax.security.auth.useSubjectAsCreds" +
" system property has been set to false");
throw new SSLProtocolException
("Server resumed session with no subject");
}
}
// looks fine; resume it, and update the state machine.
resumingSession = true;
state = HandshakeMessage.ht_finished - 1;
calculateConnectionKeys(session.getMasterSecret());
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) {
System.out.println("%% Server resumed " + session);
}
} else {
// we wanted to resume, but the server refused
session = null;
if (!enableNewSession) {
throw new SSLException("New session creation is disabled");
}
}
}
// check the ALPN extension
ALPNExtension serverHelloALPN =
(ALPNExtension) mesg.extensions.get(ExtensionType.EXT_ALPN);
if (serverHelloALPN != null) {
// Check whether an ALPN extension was sent in ClientHello message
if (!alpnActive) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_unsupported_extension,
"Server sent " + ExtensionType.EXT_ALPN +
" extension when not requested by client");
}
List<String> protocols = serverHelloALPN.getPeerAPs();
// Only one application protocol name should be present
String p;
if ((protocols.size() == 1) &&
!((p = protocols.get(0)).isEmpty())) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < localApl.length; i++) {
if (localApl[i].equals(p)) {
break;
}
}
if (i == localApl.length) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"Server has selected an application protocol name " +
"which was not offered by the client: " + p);
}
applicationProtocol = p;
} else {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"Incorrect data in ServerHello " + ExtensionType.EXT_ALPN +
" message");
}
} else {
applicationProtocol = "";
}
if (resumingSession && session != null) {
setHandshakeSessionSE(session);
// Reserve the handshake state if this is a session-resumption
// abbreviated initial handshake.
if (isInitialHandshake) {
session.setAsSessionResumption(true);
}
return;
}
// check extensions
for (HelloExtension ext : mesg.extensions.list()) {
ExtensionType type = ext.type;
if (type == ExtensionType.EXT_SERVER_NAME) {
serverNamesAccepted = true;
} else if ((type != ExtensionType.EXT_ELLIPTIC_CURVES)
&& (type != ExtensionType.EXT_EC_POINT_FORMATS)
&& (type != ExtensionType.EXT_SERVER_NAME)
&& (type != ExtensionType.EXT_ALPN)
&& (type != ExtensionType.EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO)) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_unsupported_extension,
"Server sent an unsupported extension: " + type);
}
}
// Create a new session, we need to do the full handshake
session = new SSLSessionImpl(protocolVersion, cipherSuite,
getLocalSupportedSignAlgs(),
mesg.sessionId, getHostSE(), getPortSE());
session.setRequestedServerNames(requestedServerNames);
setHandshakeSessionSE(session);
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
System.out.println("** " + cipherSuite);
}
}
/*
* Server's own key was either a signing-only key, or was too
* large for export rules ... this message holds an ephemeral
* RSA key to use for key exchange.
*/
private void serverKeyExchange(RSA_ServerKeyExchange mesg)
throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException {
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
mesg.print(System.out);
}
if (!mesg.verify(serverKey, clnt_random, svr_random)) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"server key exchange invalid");
// NOTREACHED
}
ephemeralServerKey = mesg.getPublicKey();
}
/*
* Diffie-Hellman key exchange. We save the server public key and
* our own D-H algorithm object so we can defer key calculations
* until after we've sent the client key exchange message (which
* gives client and server some useful parallelism).
*/
private void serverKeyExchange(DH_ServerKeyExchange mesg)
throws IOException {
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
mesg.print(System.out);
}
dh = new DHCrypt(mesg.getModulus(), mesg.getBase(),
sslContext.getSecureRandom());
serverDH = mesg.getServerPublicKey();
}
private void serverKeyExchange(ECDH_ServerKeyExchange mesg)
throws IOException {
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
mesg.print(System.out);
}
ECPublicKey key = mesg.getPublicKey();
ecdh = new ECDHCrypt(key.getParams(), sslContext.getSecureRandom());
ephemeralServerKey = key;
}
/*
* The server's "Hello Done" message is the client's sign that
* it's time to do all the hard work.
*/
private void serverHelloDone(ServerHelloDone mesg) throws IOException {
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
mesg.print(System.out);
}
/*
* Always make sure the input has been digested before we
* start emitting data, to ensure the hashes are correctly
* computed for the Finished and CertificateVerify messages
* which we send (here).
*/
input.digestNow();
/*
* FIRST ... if requested, send an appropriate Certificate chain
* to authenticate the client, and remember the associated private
* key to sign the CertificateVerify message.
*/
PrivateKey signingKey = null;
if (certRequest != null) {
X509ExtendedKeyManager km = sslContext.getX509KeyManager();
ArrayList<String> keytypesTmp = new ArrayList<>(4);
for (int i = 0; i < certRequest.types.length; i++) {
String typeName;
switch (certRequest.types[i]) {
case CertificateRequest.cct_rsa_sign:
typeName = "RSA";
break;
case CertificateRequest.cct_dss_sign:
typeName = "DSA";
break;
case CertificateRequest.cct_ecdsa_sign:
// ignore if we do not have EC crypto available
typeName = JsseJce.isEcAvailable() ? "EC" : null;
break;
// Fixed DH/ECDH client authentication not supported
case CertificateRequest.cct_rsa_fixed_dh:
case CertificateRequest.cct_dss_fixed_dh:
case CertificateRequest.cct_rsa_fixed_ecdh:
case CertificateRequest.cct_ecdsa_fixed_ecdh:
// Any other values (currently not used in TLS)
case CertificateRequest.cct_rsa_ephemeral_dh:
case CertificateRequest.cct_dss_ephemeral_dh:
default:
typeName = null;
break;
}
if ((typeName != null) && (!keytypesTmp.contains(typeName))) {
keytypesTmp.add(typeName);
}
}
String alias = null;
int keytypesTmpSize = keytypesTmp.size();
if (keytypesTmpSize != 0) {
String keytypes[] =
keytypesTmp.toArray(new String[keytypesTmpSize]);
if (conn != null) {
alias = km.chooseClientAlias(keytypes,
certRequest.getAuthorities(), conn);
} else {
alias = km.chooseEngineClientAlias(keytypes,
certRequest.getAuthorities(), engine);
}
}
CertificateMsg m1 = null;
if (alias != null) {
X509Certificate[] certs = km.getCertificateChain(alias);
if ((certs != null) && (certs.length != 0)) {
PublicKey publicKey = certs[0].getPublicKey();
// for EC, make sure we use a supported named curve
if (publicKey instanceof ECPublicKey) {
ECParameterSpec params =
((ECPublicKey)publicKey).getParams();
int index =
SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension.getCurveIndex(
params);
if (!SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension.isSupported(
index)) {
publicKey = null;
}
}
if (publicKey != null) {
m1 = new CertificateMsg(certs);
signingKey = km.getPrivateKey(alias);
session.setLocalPrivateKey(signingKey);
session.setLocalCertificates(certs);
}
}
}
if (m1 == null) {
//
// No appropriate cert was found ... report this to the
// server. For SSLv3, send the no_certificate alert;
// TLS uses an empty cert chain instead.
//
if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS10.v) {
m1 = new CertificateMsg(new X509Certificate [0]);
} else {
warningSE(Alerts.alert_no_certificate);
}
}
//
// At last ... send any client certificate chain.
//
if (m1 != null) {
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
m1.print(System.out);
}
m1.write(output);
}
}
/*
* SECOND ... send the client key exchange message. The
* procedure used is a function of the cipher suite selected;
* one is always needed.
*/
HandshakeMessage m2;
switch (keyExchange) {
case K_RSA:
case K_RSA_EXPORT:
if (serverKey == null) {
throw new SSLProtocolException
("Server did not send certificate message");
}
if (!(serverKey instanceof RSAPublicKey)) {
throw new SSLProtocolException
("Server certificate does not include an RSA key");
}
/*
* For RSA key exchange, we randomly generate a new
* pre-master secret and encrypt it with the server's
* public key. Then we save that pre-master secret
* so that we can calculate the keying data later;
* it's a performance speedup not to do that until
* the client's waiting for the server response, but
* more of a speedup for the D-H case.
*
* If the RSA_EXPORT scheme is active, when the public
* key in the server certificate is less than or equal
* to 512 bits in length, use the cert's public key,
* otherwise, the ephemeral one.
*/
PublicKey key;
if (keyExchange == K_RSA) {
key = serverKey;
} else { // K_RSA_EXPORT
if (JsseJce.getRSAKeyLength(serverKey) <= 512) {
// extraneous ephemeralServerKey check done
// above in processMessage()
key = serverKey;
} else {
if (ephemeralServerKey == null) {
throw new SSLProtocolException("Server did not send" +
" a RSA_EXPORT Server Key Exchange message");
}
key = ephemeralServerKey;
}
}
m2 = new RSAClientKeyExchange(protocolVersion, maxProtocolVersion,
sslContext.getSecureRandom(), key);
break;
case K_DH_RSA:
case K_DH_DSS:
/*
* For DH Key exchange, we only need to make sure the server
* knows our public key, so we calculate the same pre-master
* secret.
*
* For certs that had DH keys in them, we send an empty
* handshake message (no key) ... we flag this case by
* passing a null "dhPublic" value.
*
* Otherwise we send ephemeral DH keys, unsigned.
*/
// if (useDH_RSA || useDH_DSS)
m2 = new DHClientKeyExchange();
break;
case K_DHE_RSA:
case K_DHE_DSS:
case K_DH_ANON:
if (dh == null) {
throw new SSLProtocolException
("Server did not send a DH Server Key Exchange message");
}
m2 = new DHClientKeyExchange(dh.getPublicKey());
break;
case K_ECDHE_RSA:
case K_ECDHE_ECDSA:
case K_ECDH_ANON:
if (ecdh == null) {
throw new SSLProtocolException
("Server did not send a ECDH Server Key Exchange message");
}
m2 = new ECDHClientKeyExchange(ecdh.getPublicKey());
break;
case K_ECDH_RSA:
case K_ECDH_ECDSA:
if (serverKey == null) {
throw new SSLProtocolException
("Server did not send certificate message");
}
if (serverKey instanceof ECPublicKey == false) {
throw new SSLProtocolException
("Server certificate does not include an EC key");
}
ECParameterSpec params = ((ECPublicKey)serverKey).getParams();
ecdh = new ECDHCrypt(params, sslContext.getSecureRandom());
m2 = new ECDHClientKeyExchange(ecdh.getPublicKey());
break;
case K_KRB5:
case K_KRB5_EXPORT:
String sniHostname = null;
for (SNIServerName serverName : requestedServerNames) {
if (serverName instanceof SNIHostName) {
sniHostname = ((SNIHostName) serverName).getAsciiName();
break;
}
}
KerberosClientKeyExchange kerberosMsg = null;
if (sniHostname != null) {
// use first requested SNI hostname
try {
kerberosMsg = new KerberosClientKeyExchange(
sniHostname, getAccSE(), protocolVersion,
sslContext.getSecureRandom());
} catch(IOException e) {
if (serverNamesAccepted) {
// server accepted requested SNI hostname,
// so it must be used
throw e;
}
// fallback to using hostname
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
System.out.println(
"Warning, cannot use Server Name Indication: "
+ e.getMessage());
}
}
}
if (kerberosMsg == null) {
String hostname = getHostSE();
if (hostname == null) {
throw new IOException("Hostname is required" +
" to use Kerberos cipher suites");
}
kerberosMsg = new KerberosClientKeyExchange(
hostname, getAccSE(), protocolVersion,
sslContext.getSecureRandom());
}
// Record the principals involved in exchange
session.setPeerPrincipal(kerberosMsg.getPeerPrincipal());
session.setLocalPrincipal(kerberosMsg.getLocalPrincipal());
m2 = kerberosMsg;
break;
default:
// somethings very wrong
throw new RuntimeException
("Unsupported key exchange: " + keyExchange);
}
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
m2.print(System.out);
}
m2.write(output);
/*
* THIRD, send a "change_cipher_spec" record followed by the
* "Finished" message. We flush the messages we've queued up, to
* get concurrency between client and server. The concurrency is
* useful as we calculate the master secret, which is needed both
* to compute the "Finished" message, and to compute the keys used
* to protect all records following the change_cipher_spec.
*/
output.doHashes();
output.flush();
/*
* We deferred calculating the master secret and this connection's
* keying data; we do it now. Deferring this calculation is good
* from a performance point of view, since it lets us do it during
* some time that network delays and the server's own calculations
* would otherwise cause to be "dead" in the critical path.
*/
SecretKey preMasterSecret;
switch (keyExchange) {
case K_RSA:
case K_RSA_EXPORT:
preMasterSecret = ((RSAClientKeyExchange)m2).preMaster;
break;
case K_KRB5:
case K_KRB5_EXPORT:
byte[] secretBytes =
((KerberosClientKeyExchange)m2).getUnencryptedPreMasterSecret();
preMasterSecret = new SecretKeySpec(secretBytes,
"TlsPremasterSecret");
break;
case K_DHE_RSA:
case K_DHE_DSS:
case K_DH_ANON:
preMasterSecret = dh.getAgreedSecret(serverDH, true);
break;
case K_ECDHE_RSA:
case K_ECDHE_ECDSA:
case K_ECDH_ANON:
preMasterSecret = ecdh.getAgreedSecret(ephemeralServerKey);
break;
case K_ECDH_RSA:
case K_ECDH_ECDSA:
preMasterSecret = ecdh.getAgreedSecret(serverKey);
break;
default:
throw new IOException("Internal error: unknown key exchange "
+ keyExchange);
}
calculateKeys(preMasterSecret, null);
/*
* FOURTH, if we sent a Certificate, we need to send a signed
* CertificateVerify (unless the key in the client's certificate
* was a Diffie-Hellman key).).
*
* This uses a hash of the previous handshake messages ... either
* a nonfinal one (if the particular implementation supports it)
* or else using the third element in the arrays of hashes being
* computed.
*/
if (signingKey != null) {
CertificateVerify m3;
try {
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm preferableSignatureAlgorithm = null;
if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) {
preferableSignatureAlgorithm =
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.getPreferableAlgorithm(
peerSupportedSignAlgs, signingKey.getAlgorithm(),
signingKey);
if (preferableSignatureAlgorithm == null) {
throw new SSLHandshakeException(
"No supported signature algorithm");
}
String hashAlg =
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.getHashAlgorithmName(
preferableSignatureAlgorithm);
if (hashAlg == null || hashAlg.length() == 0) {
throw new SSLHandshakeException(
"No supported hash algorithm");
}
}
m3 = new CertificateVerify(protocolVersion, handshakeHash,
signingKey, session.getMasterSecret(),
sslContext.getSecureRandom(),
preferableSignatureAlgorithm);
} catch (GeneralSecurityException e) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure,
"Error signing certificate verify", e);
// NOTREACHED, make compiler happy
m3 = null;
}
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
m3.print(System.out);
}
m3.write(output);
output.doHashes();
}
/*
* OK, that's that!
*/
sendChangeCipherAndFinish(false);
}
/*
* "Finished" is the last handshake message sent. If we got this
* far, the MAC has been validated post-decryption. We validate
* the two hashes here as an additional sanity check, protecting
* the handshake against various active attacks.
*/
private void serverFinished(Finished mesg) throws IOException {
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) {
mesg.print(System.out);
}
boolean verified = mesg.verify(handshakeHash, Finished.SERVER,
session.getMasterSecret());
if (!verified) {
fatalSE(Alerts.alert_illegal_parameter,
"server 'finished' message doesn't verify");
// NOTREACHED
}
/*
* save server verify data for secure renegotiation
*/
if (secureRenegotiation) {
serverVerifyData = mesg.getVerifyData();
}
/*
* Reset the handshake state if this is not an initial handshake.
*/
if (!isInitialHandshake) {
session.setAsSessionResumption(false);
}
/*
* OK, it verified. If we're doing the fast handshake, add that
* "Finished" message to the hash of handshake messages, then send
* our own change_cipher_spec and Finished message for the server
* to verify in turn. These are the last handshake messages.
*
* In any case, update the session cache. We're done handshaking,
* so there are no threats any more associated with partially
* completed handshakes.
*/
if (resumingSession) {
input.digestNow();
sendChangeCipherAndFinish(true);
}
session.setLastAccessedTime(System.currentTimeMillis());
if (!resumingSession) {
if (session.isRejoinable()) {
((SSLSessionContextImpl) sslContext
.engineGetClientSessionContext())
.put(session);
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) {
System.out.println("%% Cached client session: " + session);
}
} else if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) {
System.out.println(
"%% Didn't cache non-resumable client session: "
+ session);
}
}
}
/*
* Send my change-cipher-spec and Finished message ... done as the
* last handshake act in either the short or long sequences. In
* the short one, we've already seen the server's Finished; in the
* long one, we wait for it now.
*/
private void sendChangeCipherAndFinish(boolean finishedTag)
throws IOException {
Finished mesg = new Finished(protocolVersion, handshakeHash,
Finished.CLIENT, session.getMasterSecret(), cipherSuite);
/*
* Send the change_cipher_spec message, then the Finished message
* which we just calculated (and protected using the keys we just
* calculated). Server responds with its Finished message, except
* in the "fast handshake" (resume session) case.
*/
sendChangeCipherSpec(mesg, finishedTag);
/*
* save client verify data for secure renegotiation
*/
if (secureRenegotiation) {
clientVerifyData = mesg.getVerifyData();
}
/*
* Update state machine so server MUST send 'finished' next.
* (In "long" handshake case; in short case, we're responding
* to its message.)
*/
state = HandshakeMessage.ht_finished - 1;
}
/*
* Returns a ClientHello message to kickstart renegotiations
*/
@Override
HandshakeMessage getKickstartMessage() throws SSLException {
// session ID of the ClientHello message
SessionId sessionId = SSLSessionImpl.nullSession.getSessionId();
// a list of cipher suites sent by the client
CipherSuiteList cipherSuites = getActiveCipherSuites();
// set the max protocol version this client is supporting.
maxProtocolVersion = protocolVersion;
//
// Try to resume an existing session. This might be mandatory,
// given certain API options.
//
session = ((SSLSessionContextImpl)sslContext
.engineGetClientSessionContext())
.get(getHostSE(), getPortSE());
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) {
if (session != null) {
System.out.println("%% Client cached "
+ session
+ (session.isRejoinable() ? "" : " (not rejoinable)"));
} else {
System.out.println("%% No cached client session");
}
}
if (session != null) {
// If unsafe server certificate change is not allowed, reserve
// current server certificates if the previous handshake is a
// session-resumption abbreviated initial handshake.
if (!allowUnsafeServerCertChange && session.isSessionResumption()) {
try {
// If existing, peer certificate chain cannot be null.
reservedServerCerts =
(X509Certificate[])session.getPeerCertificates();
} catch (SSLPeerUnverifiedException puve) {
// Maybe not certificate-based, ignore the exception.
}
}
if (!session.isRejoinable()) {
session = null;
}
}
if (session != null) {
CipherSuite sessionSuite = session.getSuite();
ProtocolVersion sessionVersion = session.getProtocolVersion();
if (isNegotiable(sessionSuite) == false) {
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) {
System.out.println("%% can't resume, unavailable cipher");
}
session = null;
}
if ((session != null) && !isNegotiable(sessionVersion)) {
if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) {
System.out.println("%% can't resume, protocol disabled");
}
session = null;
}
if (session != null) {
if (debug != null) {
if (Debug.isOn("handshake") || Debug.isOn("session")) {
System.out.println("%% Try resuming " + session
+ " from port " + getLocalPortSE());
}
}
sessionId = session.getSessionId();
maxProtocolVersion = sessionVersion;
// Update SSL version number in underlying SSL socket and
// handshake output stream, so that the output records (at the
// record layer) have the correct version
setVersion(sessionVersion);
}
/*
* Force use of the previous session ciphersuite, and
* add the SCSV if enabled.
*/
if (!enableNewSession) {
if (session == null) {
throw new SSLHandshakeException(
"Can't reuse existing SSL client session");
}
Collection<CipherSuite> cipherList = new ArrayList<>(2);
cipherList.add(sessionSuite);
if (!secureRenegotiation &&
cipherSuites.contains(CipherSuite.C_SCSV)) {
cipherList.add(CipherSuite.C_SCSV);
} // otherwise, renegotiation_info extension will be used
cipherSuites = new CipherSuiteList(cipherList);
}
}
if (session == null && !enableNewSession) {
throw new SSLHandshakeException("No existing session to resume");
}
// exclude SCSV for secure renegotiation
if (secureRenegotiation && cipherSuites.contains(CipherSuite.C_SCSV)) {
Collection<CipherSuite> cipherList =
new ArrayList<>(cipherSuites.size() - 1);
for (CipherSuite suite : cipherSuites.collection()) {
if (suite != CipherSuite.C_SCSV) {
cipherList.add(suite);
}
}
cipherSuites = new CipherSuiteList(cipherList);
}
// make sure there is a negotiable cipher suite.
boolean negotiable = false;
for (CipherSuite suite : cipherSuites.collection()) {
if (isNegotiable(suite)) {
negotiable = true;
break;
}
}
if (!negotiable) {
throw new SSLHandshakeException("No negotiable cipher suite");
}
// Not a TLS1.2+ handshake
// For SSLv2Hello, HandshakeHash.reset() will be called, so we
// cannot call HandshakeHash.protocolDetermined() here. As it does
// not follow the spec that HandshakeHash.reset() can be only be
// called before protocolDetermined.
// if (maxProtocolVersion.v < ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) {
// handshakeHash.protocolDetermined(maxProtocolVersion);
// }
// create the ClientHello message
ClientHello clientHelloMessage = new ClientHello(
sslContext.getSecureRandom(), maxProtocolVersion,
sessionId, cipherSuites);
// add signature_algorithm extension
if (maxProtocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) {
// we will always send the signature_algorithm extension
Collection<SignatureAndHashAlgorithm> localSignAlgs =
getLocalSupportedSignAlgs();
if (localSignAlgs.isEmpty()) {
throw new SSLHandshakeException(
"No supported signature algorithm");
}
clientHelloMessage.addSignatureAlgorithmsExtension(localSignAlgs);
}
// add server_name extension
if (enableSNIExtension) {
if (session != null) {
requestedServerNames = session.getRequestedServerNames();
} else {
requestedServerNames = serverNames;
}
if (!requestedServerNames.isEmpty()) {
clientHelloMessage.addSNIExtension(requestedServerNames);
}
}
// Add ALPN extension
if (localApl != null && localApl.length > 0) {
clientHelloMessage.addALPNExtension(localApl);
alpnActive = true;
}
// reset the client random cookie
clnt_random = clientHelloMessage.clnt_random;
/*
* need to set the renegotiation_info extension for:
* 1: secure renegotiation
* 2: initial handshake and no SCSV in the ClientHello
* 3: insecure renegotiation and no SCSV in the ClientHello
*/
if (secureRenegotiation ||
!cipherSuites.contains(CipherSuite.C_SCSV)) {
clientHelloMessage.addRenegotiationInfoExtension(clientVerifyData);
}
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